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5. The Contradictory Approach of 
the CJEU to the Judicial Review 
of Standards: A Love–Hate 
Relationship?1 
Annalisa Volpato and Mariolina Eliantonio
Odi et amo. Quare id faciam fortasse requiris.
nescio, sed fieri sentio et excrucior.
I hate and I love. Why do I do this, perhaps you ask.
I do not know, but I feel it happening and I am tortured.
(Catullus, Carmina, Poem 85)
1. INTRODUCTION
In a globalised and increasingly complex world, the role of technical standards 
in different policy fields is inevitably growing. Originating from the initia-
tive of private players and organisations, standards are often used by public 
authorities in the regulation of important economic sectors, thus progressively 
blurring the line between public and private domains.2 As a consequence of 
this increasing use of technical standards in public regulation, standards pene-
trate the legal orders in a variety of ways, both at the national and the EU level.
In particular, standards enter the EU legal system through various legal 
mechanisms. Although these mechanisms often represent well-established 
instruments in the legal traditions of Member States, they are far from being 
1 The work elaborates on a common interest of the authors. Annalisa Volpato 
wrote Sections 2 and 3.2, and Mariolina Eliantonio authored Sections 1 and 3.1. Section 
4 is the outcome of the authors’ joint effort.
2 Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Private Regimes: Neo-Spontaneous Law and Dual 
Constitution of Autonomous Sector?’ in Karl-Heinz Ladeur (ed), Public Governance 
of the Age of Globalization (Ashgate 2004) 71–87; Hanneke van Schooten and 
Jonathan Verschuuren (eds), International Governance and Law: State Regulation 
and Non-State Law (Edward Elgar 2008); Lorenzo Casini, ‘“Down the Rabbit Hole”: 
The Projection of the Public/Private Distinction beyond the State’ (2014) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 12: 402–28.
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unproblematic. Indeed, the specific legal mechanism may affect the position 
of standards vis-à-vis the EU legal system and, consequently, the possibility 
of the judicial review of standards before the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU). 
The question of accountability of private or hybrid global regulatory 
regimes is not a new one and has been considered by scholars who deal with 
the emergence and development of global administrative law.3 That scholar-
ship has indeed observed that ‘domestic systems of administrative accounta-
bility through law are being increasingly side stepped’4 by global regulatory 
mechanisms, such as standard-setting processes, producing ‘norms’ which are 
subsequently implemented at the national level.
However, most of the scholarship has concentrated on the applicability of 
general principles of due process (such as transparency and participation in 
decision-making) to global regulatory regimes.5 The scholarship which has 
3 Benedict Kingsbury and Richard B Stewart, ‘Legitimacy and Accountability 
in Global Regulatory Governance: The Emerging Global Administrative Law and the 
Design and Operation of Administrative Tribunals of International Organizations’ 
in Spyridon Flogaitis (ed), International Administrative Tribunals in a Changing 
World (Esperia 2008); and generally on global administrative law see for example 
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard B Stewart, ‘The Emergence of 
Global Administrative Law’ (2004) Law and Contemporary Problems, Issue 3, 68: 
15–61; Sabino Cassese, ‘Administrative Law Without the State? The Challenge of 
Global Regulation’ (2005) NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 37(5): 
663–94; Daniel C Esty, ‘Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing 
Administrative Law’ (2006) The Yale Law Journal 115: 1490–1562; Lorenzo 
Casini, ‘Beyond Drip-painting? Ten Years of GAL and the Emergence of a Global 
Administration’ (2015) International Journal of Constitutional Law 13(2): 473–7; 
Anthony Gordon, Jean-Bernard Auby, John Morison and Tom Zwart, Values in Global 
Administrative Law (Hart Publishing 2011); Lorenzo Casini, ‘The Expansion of the 
Material Scope of Global Law’ in Sabino Cassese (ed), Research Handbook of Global 
Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 25–44; Stefano Battini, ‘The Proliferation of 
Global Regulatory Regimes’ in Sabino Cassese (ed), Research Handbook of Global 
Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 45–64; Fabrizio Cafaggi, ‘Transnational 
Private Regulation: Regulating Global Private Regulators’ in Sabino Cassese (ed), 
Research Handbook of Global Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 212–41.
4 Richard B Stewart, ‘The Global Regulatory Challenge to U.S. Administrative 
Law’ (2005) New York University Journal of International Law and Policy 37: 695.
5 For example Lorenzo Casini, ‘Global Hybrid Public–Private Bodies: The World 
Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)’ (2009) International Organisations Law Review, 
Issue 2, 6: 421–46; Sabino Cassese, ‘Global Standards National Administrative 
Procedures’ (2005) Law and Contemporary Problems, Issue 3, 68: 109; Carol Harlow, 
‘Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values’ (2006) European 
Journal of International Law 17(1): 187–214; Stefano Battini, ‘The Procedural 
Side of Legal Globalization: The Case of the World Heritage Convention’ (2011) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, Issue 2, 9: 340; Marco Macchia, ‘The 
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examined the judicial side of the production of norms at the global level has 
focused on the existence and effectiveness of international courts,6 thereby 
neglecting the question of judicial supervision and judicial review of standards 
at the domestic level.
The question of the availability of judicial review is one which strikes at the 
core of the inner struggle of global and hybrid regulatory regimes: the quest 
for efficiency while preserving the basic tenets of the rule of law.7 Indeed, ‘the 
institutional bedrock of most rule of law models lies in judicial review as an 
independent review of the legality of administrative action’.8 The availability 
of judicial review, in turn, would be able to enhance the legitimacy of the 
standardisation process as a regulatory technique since it would guarantee 
an ex post control of the activities of the standard-setting bodies. From this 
perspective, one could argue that judicial review would contribute both to 
‘the internal legitimacy of an organization that can plausibly claim to adhere 
to its own rules, but also to its external legitimacy, in that it would be open to 
impartial control’.9 Also, the availability of judicial review could serve to com-
pensate for the shortcomings identified with respect to the transparency and 
representativeness of various standard-setting bodies, by adding an additional 
layer of control.10
Rule of Law and Transparency in the Global Space’ in Sabino Cassese (ed), Research 
Handbook of Global Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 261–81; Simon 
Chestennan, ‘Globalization Rules: Accountability, Power, and the Prospects for Global 
Administrative Law’ (2008) Global Governance, Issue 1, 14: 39.
6 See for example Mikael R Madsen, ‘Judicial Globalization: The Proliferation 
of International Courts’ in Sabino Cassese (ed), Research Handbook of Global 
Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 282–302; Elisa D’Alterio, ‘Judicial 
Regulation in the Global Space’, in Sabino Cassese (ed), Research Handbook of Global 
Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 303–24. See also Barbara Marchetti, ‘The 
Enforcement of Global Decisions’ in Sabino Cassese (ed), Research Handbook of 
Global Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 242–60, who, however, considers the 
enforcement rather than the review of global norms at the domestic level.
7 Christoph Möllers, ‘Constitutional Foundations of Global Administration’ in 
Sabino Cassese (ed), Research Handbook of Global Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 
2016) 107–30.
8 Ibid, 113.
9 Ibid. Further on this Joseph HH Weiler, ‘The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos 
of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute 
Settlement’ (2001) Journal of World Trade, Issue 2, 35: 191.
10 See for example with regard to the Codex Alimentarius, Alexia Herwig, 
‘The Contribution of Global Administrative Law to the Legitimacy of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission’ in Olaf Dilling, Martin Herberg and Gerd Winter (eds), 
Transnational Administrative Rule-Making (Hart Publishing 2011). See also in general 
for this issue concerning the networks of regulators, Paul Craig, ‘Global Networks 
and Shared Administration’ in Sabino Cassese (ed), Research Handbook of Global 
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Furthermore, the availability of judicial review of standards would increase 
the so-called throughput legitimacy of this phenomenon. While input legit-
imacy relates to the responsiveness to citizens’ concerns as a result of 
participation by the people,11 throughput legitimacy is judged in terms of effi-
cacy, accountability and transparency. Despite the fact that ‘standard-setting 
requires not only scientific knowledge, but also subjective policy decisions 
about the level of risk a society is willing to accept’,12 the input legitimacy 
of the standardisation process is considered to be remarkably low.13 In light 
of this, judicial review as a tenet of throughput legitimacy in its specific 
dimension of accountability could compensate for the low performance of the 
standardisation process in terms of input legitimacy. 
Against the backdrop of the importance of judicial review for the legitimacy 
of the standard-setting procedures, and the lack of research on this topic,14 
this chapter aims to fill this academic gap by examining the different ways 
in which standards enter the EU legal order. Discussing the role and legal 
value of standards in the EU legal system is essential not only for the pur-
poses of determining the current possibilities of judicially reviewing them, 
but also, normatively, in order to establish to what extent the standards ought 
to be reviewable in the first place. If indeed the purpose of judicial review 
Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 153–74 and the seminal work by Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press 2004).
11 Vivien A Schmidt, ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: 
Input, Output and “Throughput”’ (2013) Political Studies, Issue 1, 61: 2–22.
12 Lori M Wallach, ‘Accountable Governance in the Era of Globalization: The 
WTO, NAFTA and the International Harmonization of Standards’ (2002) University of 
Kansas Law Review, Issue 4, 50: 863.
13 See for example Nicholas Hachez and Jan Wouters, ‘A Glimpse at The 
Democratic Legitimacy of Private Standards – Assessing the Public Accountability of 
Global G.A.P.’ (2011) Journal of International Economic Law 14(3): 677–710; Morten 
Kallestrup, ‘Stakeholder Participation in European Standardization: A Mapping and 
an Assessment of Three Categories of Regulation’ (2017) Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration 44(4): 381–94; Sabrina Wirtz, The Interplay of Global Standards and EU 
Pharmaceutical Regulation (PhD thesis 2017) 207–32.
14 See however the recent works done on judicial review of the European stand-
ardisation process, for instance Mariolina Eliantonio, ‘Judicial Control of the EU 
Harmonized Standards: Entering a Black Hole?’ (2017) Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration 44(4): 399–404; Carlo Tovo, ‘Judicial Review of Harmonised Standards: 
Changing the Paradigms of Legality and Legitimacy of Private Rulemaking under EU 
Law’ (2018) Common Market Law Review, Issue 4, 55: 1187–1216; Annalisa Volpato, 
‘The Harmonized Standards before the ECJ: James Elliott Construction’ (2017) 
Common Market Law Review 54: 591–604; Mariolina Eliantonio and Carlo Colombo, 
‘Harmonized Technical Standards as Part of EU Law: Juridification with a Number 
of Unresolved Legitimacy Concerns?’ (2017) Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 24(2): 323–40.
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is to support the realisation of the rule of law and enhance the legitimacy of 
standardisation as a regulatory technique, given the variety of standard-setting 
processes, and the ensuing variety of modalities in which standards become 
part of EU law, the answer to the normative quest for judicial review cannot be 
monolithic. In this respect, relevant criteria to be taken into account are 
the hierarchical status of the rule in question, its dependence on further political 
decisions, the formal possibility to deviate from it, and the existence of procedural 
possibilities to revise it. The more entrenched, directly applicable and hierarchically 
supreme the norm, the more urgent is its lack of legitimacy. The more exposed is the 
rule to independent review and to political procedures of exemption and alteration, 
the less demanding are the expectations for a legitimate rule-making procedure15 
The consequent need for judicial review is a further relevant criterion.
This contribution will first examine different legal mechanisms by which 
standards enter the EU legal system and then focus on the issues relating to 
the judicial review of standards and the effective protection of the individuals’ 
rights affected. 
2. ENTERING THE EU LEGAL ORDER: HOW 
STANDARDS PIERCE THE EU LAW VEIL
2.1 The Incorporation of Private Standards by Reference 
In an overview of the ways in which standards enter the EU legal system,16 
the first mechanism to consider is undoubtedly the reference to private 
standards in EU legislation. Indeed, the EU legislator may introduce in its 
acts provisions which do not directly regulate the matter, but refer to rules 
established by standardisation bodies, thus indirectly granting a regulation for 
the relevant activities. Such references may be contained in legislative acts,17 
or non-legislative acts;18 they may concern standards elaborated by bodies 
15 Möllers, above n. 7, 123.
16 See in general on the incorporation of norms produced at the global level in the 
national legal systems and the incentives for their incorporation, Richard B Stewart, 
‘Global Standards for National Societies’ in Sabino Cassese (ed), Research Handbook 
of Global Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 175–98.
17 See, for instance, Articles 7 and 8 of Regulation (EC) 648/2004 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on detergents [2004] OJ L104, 1–35 (referring to ISO 
standards on tests for surfactants and good laboratories practices). See also the Annexes 
of the same Regulation.
18 See, for instance, Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/1358 on the 
identification of ICT Technical Specifications for referencing in public procurement 
[2017] OJ L190, 16–19 (referring to technical specifications of 3WC, OASIS, Internet 
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established in connection to international law treaties,19 or by purely private 
organisations.20
In this regard, the most straightforward example is the Commission meas-
ures through which references to CEN/CENELEC standards are published in 
the Official Journal pursuant to the corresponding New Approach directives 
or regulations.21 Indeed, the New Approach consists precisely in regulating 
through legislative acts only the ‘essential requirements’ of general interest of 
a product, while delegating the detailed definition of technical aspects to these 
private organisations composed of experts and representatives of the business 
sector.22 The following publication by the Commission endows these technical 
standards with the legal nature of ‘harmonised European standards’ and pro-
vides a presumption of conformity with the secondary law measures they are 
aimed at complementing. As recently recognised by the Court, the result of this 
mechanism is that the harmonised standards are to be considered as ‘part of EU 
law’,23 being incorporated by reference into the EU legal system.
Although the New Approach represents a highly idiosyncratic system which 
raises peculiar questions in terms of legitimacy,24 incorporation by reference 
Engineering Task Force and Internet Engineering Task Force, all private standardisa-
tion bodies).
19 Such as the Universal Postal Union, which was established by the Treaty of 
Bern of 1874 and is composed of 192 member countries. Its standards are referred to in 
Articles 226 and 227 of Regulation (EU) 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council laying down the Union Customs Code [2013] OJ L269, 1–101.
20 Such as the abovementioned 3WC (World Wide Web Consortium) which is 
composed of private companies, NGOs, research institutes and universities.
21 On the New Approach, see inter alia Harm Schepel, The Constitution of Private 
Governance: Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating Markets (Hart 
Publishing 2005); Jacques Pelkmans, ‘The New Approach to Technical Harmonisation 
and Standardisation’ (1987) Journal of Common Market Studies 25(3): 249–69. On the 
recent shift in the Commission’s practice, see para 3.1.
22 See Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market: 
White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, Milan, 28–29 June 1985, 
COM(85)310 final; Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a new approach to technical 
harmonisation and standards, [1985] OJ C136/1; Council Resolution of 21 December 
1989 on a global approach to conformity assessment, [1990] OJ C10/1; Regulation 
(EU) 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on European standard-
isation, [2012] OJ L316/12.
23 See Case C-613/14, James Elliott Construction Limited v Irish Asphalt Limited 
EU: C: 2016: 821, para 40. See also C-185/17, Mitnitsa Varna v SAKSA EU: C: 2018: 108.
24 See, inter alia, Christian Joerges, Harm Schepel and Ellen Vos, The Law’s 
Problems with the Involvement of Non-Governmental Actors in Europe’s Legislative 
Processes: The Case of Standardisation under the New Approach, EUI Working 
Paper No 99/9 (1999); Ernesto Previdi, ‘The Organisation of Public and Private 
Responsibilities in European Risk Regulation: An Institutional Gap between Them?’ 
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does not constitute an entirely new technique in law. In fact, references to 
rules established by other legal systems, and even by private organisations,25 
are quite common in national law. In this context, constitutional law scholars 
have elaborated the fundamental distinction between ‘static’ references, which 
are directed to specific acts or provisions, and ‘dynamic’ references, which 
concern the legal source of the acts in its decision-making activities. While 
the static reference entails the incorporation of the provision referred to as it is 
at the moment of reference, the dynamic reference comprises the subsequent 
modifications of the rule enacted by that source, thus allowing the evolution of 
the normative provisions deriving from that source to be taken into account.26
While such a distinction was expressly elaborated in relation to national 
legal systems, EU law arguably also presents examples of these variants of 
reference. Thus, on the one hand, for instance, Article 2 of Directive 2016/802 
refers to a precise method elaborated by ASTM International, a US-based 
standardisation body.27 This kind of reference allows the interpreter to clearly 
identify and apply the relevant rule with the content intended by the EU leg-
islator, thus granting legal certainty with regard to the status of the rule in the 
relevant legal system. On the other hand, a dynamic reference, such as Article 
226 of the Union Custom Code referring to ‘the acts of the Universal Postal 
Union’,28 permits the constant adaptation of the legal framework to normative 
and technical progress without the need to amend the EU measure. In this 
in Christian Joerges, Integrating Scientific Expertise into Regulatory Decision-Making 
(Nomos 1997) 225–42; Linda Senden, ‘The Constitutional Fit of European 
Standardization Put to the Test’ (2017) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 44(4): 
337–52; Megi Medzmariashvili, ‘Delegation of Rulemaking Power to European 
Standards Organizations: Reconsidered’ (2017) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 
44(4): 353–66; Tovo, above n. 14, 1187–1216; Eliantonio and Colombo, above n. 14, 
323–40.
25 See, inter alia, the US case State v Crawford, [1919] Kansas 177, cited also in 
Maurizia De Bellis, ‘Public Law and Private Regulators in the Global Legal Space’ 
(2011) International Journal of Constitutional Law 9(2): 425–48.
26 For the notion of fixed and dynamic reference in Italian literature, see, inter alia, 
Vezio Crisafulli, Lezioni di diritto costituzionale (Cedam 1970); Livio Paladin, Le fonti 
del diritto italiano (Il Mulino 1993); Roberto Bin and Giovanni Pitruzzella, Diritto 
co-stituzionale (Giappichelli 2003).
27 Specifically, the ASTM D86 method. See Article 2 of Directive (EU) 2016/802 
of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to a reduction in the sulphur 
content of certain liquid fuels [2016] OJ L132, 58–78.
28 Other examples of dynamic referral may be found in Article 7 of Regulation 
(EC) 648/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on detergents [2004] OJ 
L104, 1–35; Annex II of Regulation (EC) 661/2009 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council concerning type-approval requirements for the general safety of motor 
vehicles, their trailers and systems, components and separate technical units intended 
therefor [2009] OJ L200, 1–24; Annex I of Directive 2009/125/EC of the European 
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sense, despite its problematic implications, the dynamic referral provides more 
flexibility and efficiency in rule-making, rendering this a valuable instrument 
in the hands of the legislator.29
While the distinction is clear in the abstract, the concrete qualification of 
a reference as a static or dynamic may give rise to certain doubts in specific 
cases. An example emerges from the legal framework for the approval of 
vehicles in the EU. Directive 2007/46/EC establishes a framework for the 
approval of motor vehicles and their trailers,30 and makes extensive reference 
to the UNECE Regulations as alternative and equivalent rules applicable 
for this approval.31 In this regard, in 1958 the EU decided to accede to the 
Agreement of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe con-
cerning the adoption of uniform technical prescriptions for wheeled vehicles 
(the so-called Revised 1958 Agreement). The international standards and 
regulations adopted within this framework at the time of EU accession are 
considered ‘incorporated within the Community type-approval procedure 
either as requirements for EC vehicle type-approval, or as alternatives to 
existing Community law’.32 In order to avoid a duplication of regulation at EU 
and international level, these regulations are simply referred to in the Annexes 
of the Framework Directive without reproducing them in the directive or in 
its implementing measures.33 Although the recitals may suggest that this is 
a typical case of dynamic reference, Article 35(2) of the Framework Directive 
makes it clear that the subsequent modifications are not automatically incor-
porated in EU law, but require an express decision of the Council. In the case 
of new UNECE regulations or amendments, the Council may decide to adopt 
them and the Commission is empowered to amend the relevant parts of the 
Annex to the Framework Directive.34 Therefore, considering that an act of 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the setting of ecodesign 
requirements for energy-related products [2009] OJ L285, 10–35.
29 De Bellis, above n. 25, 428.
30 Directive 2007/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establish-
ing a framework for the approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, 
components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles (Framework 
Directive) [2007] OJ L263, 1–160.
31 Articles 34 and 35 of the Framework Directive.
32 Recital 11 of the Framework Directive. In particular, the UNECE Amendments 
listed in Part I of Annex IV are part of the EC type-approval of a vehicle in the same 
way as the separate directives or regulations, whereas those listed in Part II of the same 
Annex are recognised as being equivalent to the corresponding separate directives or 
regulations.
33 As recommended by Recital 12 of the Framework Directive.
34 Recital 11 and Article 35(2) of the Framework Directive. See Diego Zannoni, 
‘Balancing Market Needs and Environmental Protection: Vehicle Approval in the 
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an EU institution, albeit at a subordinate level of the Framework Directive, 
is needed, arguably this qualifies the referring provisions as static references.
2.2 The Incorporation of Private Standards by Reproduction
In addition to the legal mechanism of reference, standards also penetrate the 
EU legal order in other – somewhat more subtle – ways. Notably, international 
standards are sometimes incorporated in EU measures, reproducing verbatim 
the wording of the relevant standards and, thus, becoming part of EU law. The 
origin of the rules as international standards may be more or less evident and 
this kind of incorporation may involve binding or non-binding acts.
Among the international standards incorporated as non-binding EU law 
are the standards elaborated by the International Council for Harmonisation 
of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH), an 
international standardisation body bringing together the regulatory authorities 
of different countries and the pharmaceutical industry.35 The standards of this 
organisation, which is the leading global standard-setter for pharmaceuticals, 
are often adopted as guidelines by the European Medicines Agency (EMA).36
The incorporation of international standards in EU law may be demanded 
by international obligations which bind the EU under international law. For 
instance, in the context of the WTO agreements, the SPS and TBT agreements 
expressly require the Member States to use the international standards as 
‘a basis for their technical regulations’.37 While this obligation was initially 
interpreted as requiring that the Member State ‘adopt[s] some, not necessarily 
all, of the elements of the international standard’,38 in the Sardines case the 
WTO Appellate Body clarified that a ‘very strong and very close relationship’ 
is needed to consider a national rule as based on an international standard.39
This obligation is qualified by the possibility for the Member States to 
introduce or maintain national rules which provide a higher level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection,40 or which are necessary to fulfil a legitimate objec-
European Union’ (2018) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 25(4): 
500–15.
35 For a detailed analysis, see the contribution by Sabrina Wirtz in this book.
36 Remarkably, 19 per cent of the European Medicines Agency guidelines originate 
in the ICH. See Wirtz, above n. 13, 273.
37 Article 2.4 TBT Agreement. See also Article 3.1 SPS Agreement.
38 Appellate Body, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
WT/DS26/AB7R, WT/DS48/AB/R) 16 January 1998, para 76.
39 Appellate Body, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, (WT/
DS231/AB/R) 23 October 2002, para 245.
40 Article 3.3 SPS Agreement.
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tive.41 However, in this case specific procedural duties apply,42 such as a notice 
and comment procedure.43 Furthermore, national rules mirroring the relevant 
international standards enjoy a presumption of conformity with the obligations 
under the WTO agreements, particularly useful in case of litigation before the 
WTO Dispute Resolution Boards, thus providing remarkable incentives for the 
incorporation of these standards.44
For these reasons, Article 13 of Regulation 178/2002 laying down the 
general principles and requirements of food law includes an obligation for the 
EU and its Member States to ‘promote consistency between international tech-
nical standards and food law while ensuring that the high level of protection 
adopted in the Community is not reduced’.45 Accordingly, EU food law is often 
drafted on the basis of the standards elaborated by the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission,46 an international body expressly mentioned along with the 
International Office of Epizootics (IOE) and the International Plant Protection 
Convention (IPPC) in the SPS Agreement. Thus, through the drafting of EU 
law in accordance with the outputs of these international standardisation 
bodies, international standards affecting the health and safety of human, 
animal and plant life are incorporated in EU measures.47
Even more complex is the way international standards elaborated in relation 
to the TBT Agreement enter the EU legal order. In this regard, it is interesting 
41 Legitimate objectives are, inter alia, national security requirements; the preven-
tion of deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or 
health, or the environment. See Article 2.2 TBT Agreement.
42 Under Article 3.3 SPS Agreement, the Member State must also provide a scien-
tific justification for the measure.
43 Article 2.5 and 2.9 TBT Agreement. See also De Bellis, above n. 25, 437.
44 Article 2.5 TBT Agreement and Article 3.2 SPS Agreement. See also De Bellis, 
above n. 25, 437.
45 Article 13(e) of Regulation (EC) 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establish-
ing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food 
safety [2002] OJ L31, 1–24.
46 The Codex Alimentarius Commission, established in 1961 under the auspices of 
the FAO and the WTO, is composed of the representatives of 189 States plus the EU. It 
meets once a year with the aim of developing and updating international standards and 
guidelines to protect the health of consumers and to ensure fair practices in the interna-
tional food trade. Although the Member States were already members of this organisa-
tion, the EU has formally acceded the Codex with Council Decision 2003/822/CE. See, 
inter alia, Luigi Costato, Compendio di diritto alimentare (Cedam 2015) 37–9.
47 See, for instance, Directive 2012/12/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Council Directive 2001/112/EC relating to fruit juices and certain 
similar products intended for human consumption [2012] OJ L115, 1–11, adopted to 
take account of developments in the Codex General Standard for fruit juices and nectars 
(Codex Stan 247-2005).
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to note that, although the TBT Agreement does not mention explicitly the rel-
evant standardisation bodies, they can easily be identified as the International 
Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC).48 With the view to removing the international obstacles 
to trade and promoting the interoperability of products,49 whenever possible 
the standards elaborated by these organisations constitute the basis for the 
elaboration of European standards by CEN and CENELEC.50 When foreseen 
in the relevant legislative acts, thus, they become part of EU law through the 
reference in the Official Journal.
3. THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STANDARDS
The incorporation of international and European standards into the EU legal 
order arguably implies that, in accordance with the rule of law,51 these stand-
ards are required to be subject to sufficient judicial control by the CJEU, 
notwithstanding the fact that the rules find their origin outside the EU legal 
system. As recently argued by Advocate General Bobek, the incorporation 
of an originally external legal act into EU law cannot result in ‘black holes’ 
of judicial review, which would arise if the standards were shielded from 
a judicial control by the mere fact of being originally drafted by a third party.52 
48 De Bellis, above n. 25, 436.
49 The European Standardisation Bodies are members of the ISO and take part 
in the elaboration of these international standards. Although the ISO statute does 
not require the members to adopt the international standards (see Article 4.2 of ISO 
Statutes), in 1991 the CEN has stipulated an agreement for technical cooperation with 
the ISO (the so-called Vienna agreement) with the aim of preventing duplication of 
standards, which recognises the primacy of international standards and promotes the 
‘adoption of existing international standards as European standards’ (see Article 4 of 
the Vienna agreement). See also the IEC–CENELEC Agreement on common planning 
of new work and parallel voting, signed in Frankfurt in 2016.
50 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions ‘European Standards for the 21st Century’, COM(2016) 358, 2. In particular, 
in 2017, 33 per cent of the CEN catalogue was identical or based on the ISO delivera-
bles, whereas 72 per cent of the CENELEC catalogue was identical or based on the IEC 
deliverables (see Global Outreach Report Q4 2017, available at www .cencenelec .eu).
51 For the definition of the EU as a ‘Community based on the rule of law’, see Case 
294/83 Les Verts v Parliament EU: C: 1986: 166, para 23.
52 See Opinion of Advocate General Bobek in Case C-587/15 Lietuvos Respublikos 
transporto priemonių draudikų biuras v Gintaras Dockevičius and Jurgita Dockevičienė 
EU: C: 2017: 234, para 88: ‘Once an EU institution decides to incorporate an originally 
external legal act into EU law and to draw legal consequences from it by effectively 
enforcing it internally … the same institution cannot later turn a blind eye and suggest 
that since that act was originally drafted by a third party, it is therefore not an act of that 
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However, the use of the specific legal mechanism of the reference raises two 
issues which are well known in private international law: the possibility to 
review the legality of the applicable rules and the problem of the legal frame-
work against which the legality of these rules can be assessed.53
3.1 The Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
on Standards
The problem arises in different terms for standards produced by European 
standardisation organisations according to the New Approach (or standards 
produced at the global level by an international standardisation organisation 
and which later become harmonised European standards), and global standards 
which are referred to or reproduced into EU binding or non-binding legislation. 
First, it is by now established, following the James Elliott case,54 that 
a harmonised European standard can be reviewed by the European courts in 
preliminary questions of interpretation,55 as well as of validity,56 under Article 
267 TFEU. This is because a harmonised European standard, elaborated 
by an organisation governed by private law, is considered to form part of 
EU law ‘when that standard was conceived, managed and monitored by the 
Commission, and when it produces binding legal effects following publica-
tion of its references in the Official Journal’.57 Rather surprisingly, however, 
even when all these conditions are met, not all the elements of a harmonised 
European standard necessarily become part of EU law. In the Mitnitsa case, 
the Court considered a harmonised European standard drawn up by CEN on 
the basis of a Commission request not to form part of EU law with regard to 
the specific part of the standard that was not related to the reference made in 
the relevant legislative act.58 
Even less clear is whether harmonised European standards can be subject 
to a direct action under Article 263 TFEU. Contrary to the opinion of the 
institution. Allowing for such “black holes” of judicial review would be incompatible 
with the vision of a Union based on the rule of law.’
53 See, inter alia, Bruno Barel and Stefano Armellini, Diritto Internazionale 
Privato (Giuffré 2016) 71–8; Tito Ballarino, Eleonora Ballarino and Ilaria Pretelli, 
Diritto internazionale privato italiano (Cedam 2013).
54 Case C-613/14 James Elliott Construction Limited v Irish Asphalt Limited EU: C: 
2016: 821.
55 This stems directly from the James Elliott case, para 34.
56 See Toolbox #18 ‘The Choice of Policy Instrument’, attached to the latest 
Better Regulation package. https:// ec .europa .eu/ info/ sites/ info/ files/ file _import/ better 
-regulation -toolbox -18 _en _0 .pdf.
57 Case C-185/17, Mitnitsa Varna v SAKSA EU: C: 2018: 108, para 39.
58 Ibid, para 42.
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Advocate General in the case,59 in James Elliott  the Court refused to consider 
them as ‘acts of EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union’.60 
Therefore, even without considering the issues related to the locus standi 
of private individuals in such direct actions,61 the possibility of challenging 
a harmonised European standard under Article 263 TFEU remains controver-
sial. An alternative to the direct action against a harmonised standard is the 
possibility of challenging the act of the Commission containing the reference 
to the standard,62 and then raising the issue of the legality of the harmonised 
European standard before the Court.63 In this regard, the recent shift in the 
practice of the Commission – which now publishes the reference to harmo-
nised European standards in the L series of the Official Journal in the form of 
an Implementing Decision,64 instead of in the C series as a Communication – is 
remarkable. Arguably, this shift opens up a clearer avenue for reviewing har-
monised standards, since the ‘reviewable act’ nature of this decision to publish 
the reference can no longer be called into question.65 
Second, in the case of globally produced standards, one would have to 
make a further differentiation between global standards which later become 
harmonised European standards, for which the considerations above should 
apply, and global standards which are instead referred to or reproduced into 
binding or non-binding secondary legislation. In the case of incorporation of 
global standards by reproduction into EU legislation, it could be argued that 
59 Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona in Case C-631/14 James Elliott 
Construction Limited v Irish Asphalt Limited EU: C: 2016: 63, para 40.
60 Case C-613/14 James Elliott Construction Limited v Irish Asphalt Limited EU: C: 
2016: 821, para 34. See, inter alia, Volpato, above n. 14, 600–1.
61 Eliantonio, above n. 14, 399–404.
62 Such a possibility was presented as admissible by the Court as early as Case 
T-474/15 Global Garden Products Italy SpA v European Commission ECLI: EU: T: 
2017: 36, para 60. In literature, see inter alia Harm Schepel, ‘The New Approach to 
the New Approach: The Juridification of Harmonised Standards in EU Law’ (2013) 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 20(4): 531.
63 See, by analogy, the case law on the preparatory measures: Joined cases 12/64 
and 29/64, Ley v Commission, EU: C: 1965: 28, para 118; Joined cases T-10-12 and 
15/92, Cimenteries and others v Commission, EU: T: 1992: 123, para 31; Case T-123/03, 
Pfizer v Commission, EU: T: 2004: 167, para 24; Case T-108/92, Calò v Commission, 
EU: T: 1994: 22, para 13.
64 See the publication of Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/2048 of 
20 December 2018 on the harmonised standard for websites and mobile applications 
drafted in support of Directive (EU) 2016/2102 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, OJ L327 of 21 December 2018, 84–6.
65 See Annalisa Volpato and Mariolina Eliantonio, ‘The Butterfly Effect of 
Publishing References to Harmonised Standards in the L Series’ europeanlawblog.eu 
(7 March 2019).
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there should be no hurdles to the ‘knowability’ of these standards by the Court, 
as these standards are copied and pasted into EU measures, becoming indistin-
guishable from EU acts.66
However, a recent case concerning the so-called Green Card system, and in 
particular an international certificate attesting that the driver is insured against 
civil liability for any accident that may occur in the ‘host country’ adopted 
and administered by the Council of Bureaux, an international non-profit 
association established under Belgian law, would seem to cast doubts on this 
conclusion.67 In this case, the global standard was incorporated by reproduc-
tion in an Annex to a Commission Decision, the interpretation of which was 
requested by a national court under Article 267 TFEU. The Advocate General 
in his opinion referred to James Elliot and concluded that 
in Elliott, the Court confirmed its jurisdiction to interpret a harmonised standard 
adopted by CEN (an organisation governed by private law) which had been pub-
lished in the C series of the Official Journal. The Court noted that such a standard 
forms part of EU law, even more so if compliance with such standards is being 
enforced by the Commission. If such a conclusion holds for a technical standard 
published as a mere communication in the C series of the Official Journal, I am 
bound to conclude that the same must also apply, a fortiori, to that part of the 
Commission’s decision published in the Official Journal as binding legislation in 
the L series of the Official Journal. Moreover, as already stated above, there are 
enforceable obligations flowing from that decision, likely to be enforced by the 
Commission.68
Yet the Court reached the opposite conclusion and without mentioning James 
Elliott simply stated that it did not have jurisdiction to interpret the private 
global norms because they ‘were drawn up and concluded by bodies governed 
by private law without any institution, body, office or agency of the European 
Union participating in their conclusion’.69 If the Court refused to interpret this 
global norm, it is even less likely that it would accept jurisdiction to review the 
validity of a globally produced standard even if it is reproduced into EU sec-
ondary law. In other words, this judgment calls for some caution with regard 
to the scope which the Court of Justice would set for its own jurisdiction to 
interpret globally produced standards which are reproduced into EU second-
ary legislation. The criterion emerging from this judgment – referring to the 
66 Röttger-Wirtz, above n. 13, 273.
67 Case C-587/15 Lietuvos Respublikos transporto priemonių draudikų biuras v 
Gintaras Dockevičius and Jurgita Dockevičienė ECLI: EU: C: 2017: 463.
68 Opinion of Advocate General Bobek in Case C-587/15 Lietuvos Respublikos 
transporto priemonių draudikų biuras v Gintaras Dockevičius and Jurgita Dockevičienė 
EU: C: 2017: 234, paras 85–86.
69 Para 39.
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involvement of EU institutions in the standard-setting activities – appears to 
be far from convincing, leaving open questions on the extent and the effective-
ness needed for this involvement to establish the Court’s jurisdiction on these 
global standards.70
Third, the same conclusion should a fortiori apply to global standards 
which are ‘merely’ referred to in EU legislation. However, a case concerning 
the challenge to a piece of EU binding secondary legislation which referred 
to a global standard produced by the International Organisation of Vine and 
Wine (an intergovernmental body, OIV in the French acronym), seems to 
show another inconsistency of the Court in its scrutiny of standards. When 
discussing the legal value and force of the standards produced by the OIV, the 
Court stated that the standards clearly have ‘legal effects’ and were ‘capable 
of decisively influencing the content of the legislation adopted by the EU 
legislature’,71 since the legal framework provided that the Commission was to 
‘base itself’ on these standards when authorising oenological practices. This 
statement and the recognition of legal value of global standards in the EU legal 
system seems to be at odds with the Court’s refusal to recognise its own juris-
diction on the interpretation (and a fortiori the validity) of the same standards.
3.2 The Legal Framework for Assessment
If the jurisdiction of the European courts on at least some of the standards 
applicable at the EU level is not certain, even more problematic is the question 
of the frame of reference according to which a standard would be judged. 
In general, it could be argued that the first benchmark to assess their legality 
should be the same provision containing the reference to the standard. Indeed, 
while making the standard part of EU law, it may establish the limits and the 
conditions for this incorporation of the standard into the EU legal system.72 For 
the particular case of harmonised standards, moreover, the Court clarified in 
Anstar that such standards must be interpreted in the light of the request from 
which they originate, which thus defines the limits for their interpretation and 
validity.73 Furthermore, Regulation 1025/2012 defines specific principles and 
procedures for their adoption, making the acquisition of the presumption of 
70 For instance, in relation to the standard elaborated by ICH, it is questionable 
whether the participation of officials from the European Commission and/or EMA is 
sufficient to fulfil this criterion.
71 C-399/12, Germany v Council ECLI: EU: C: 2014: 2258, para 63.
72 See Case C-185/17, Mitnitsa Varna v SAKSA EU: C: 2018: 108, para 42.
73 C-630/16, Anstar Oy v Tukes EU: C: 2017: 971, paras 35–36.
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conformity dependent on respect for these rules.74 Therefore, in the case of 
harmonised European standards (including those originating at global level), 
the frame of reference is constituted not only by the essential requirements 
established in the relevant New Approach directive, but also by the request of 
the Commission and the provisions of Regulation 1025/2021.
However, it is less clear whether general principles of European adminis-
trative law, such as the principles of transparency and participation enshrined 
in Article 11 TFEU, apply to the European standardisation process, since 
harmonised European standards still remain acts of private organisations and 
not acts of EU institutions.75
The question becomes even more complex in the case of global standards, 
which originate from a different legal order and are ‘only’ incorporated into 
EU law. Indeed, it is questionable whether the elaboration of technical stand-
ards which are destined to be incorporated in EU law needs to abide by EU 
law, more precisely by the principles and rules of European administrative 
law. In other words, the question is whether the incorporation of the standards 
in the EU legal system in the ways analysed determines the application of the 
legal framework pertinent to the exercise of public power under EU law, or 
rather whether their legality shall be assessed according to the parameters and 
principles of their specific system. In this regard, it is interesting to recall that, 
in private international law, the use of the specific legal mechanism of the ref-
erence entails that the specific provision referred to shall be assessed under the 
parameters and with the methods of its own legal system.76 Therefore, in the 
case of reference to standards elaborated by external standardisation bodies, 
the specific legal framework for assessing the legality of the standards ought 
not to be EU administrative law principles,77 but rather the rules and proce-
74 See Article 10(6) of Regulation (EU) 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on European Standardisation [2012] OJ L316, 12–33.
75 See further, Mariolina Eliantonio, ‘Private Actors, Public Authorities and the 
Relevance of Public Law in the Process of European Standardization’ (2018) European 
Public Law 24(3): 473–90.
76 In this sense, the reference is directed not to the single rule, but to the legal 
system in its ‘globality’. See, inter alia, Barel and Armellini, above n. 53, 77. Contra 
Ballarino, Ballarino and Pretelli, above n. 53.
77 For a discussion of the qualification of European standardisation bodies as part 
of EU administration and, consequently, the possibility of applying administrative law 
principles to standardisation, see Matteo Gnes, ‘Do Administrative Law Principles 
Apply to European Standardisation: Agencification or Privatisation?’ (2017) Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration, Issue 4, 44: 367–80.
Annalisa Volpato and Mariolina Eliantonio - 9781789902952
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 11/13/2020 11:14:31AM
via University of Exeter
The Contradictory Approach of the CJEU to the Judicial Review of Standards 107
dures established by the same standardisation bodies in their self-regulation 
capacity.78
It is important, however, to recall also that such an approach in private inter-
national law is generally tempered by the application of limits guaranteeing 
the respect of the fundamental values of the legal system.79 By analogy, it is 
arguable that the Court of Justice, when deciding on the validity of a standard 
incorporated in EU law, cannot refrain from ensuring respect of the democratic 
principles and the rule of law, which constitute the foundations of the EU legal 
order. The use of the specific legal mechanism of the reference, arguably, 
cannot justify a diminished protection of such fundamental principles, which 
are thus to be taken into account in the assessment of the legality of the stand-
ards, even where the standards enter the EU legal order through a reference.
In this respect, the Kadi saga, concerning the legality of EC Regulations 
that had implemented UN Security Council resolutions that listed and imposed 
sanctions on individuals suspected of involvement in international terrorism, 
is instructive. Indeed, in Kadi I the General Court argued that a global norm 
cannot be reviewed against EU law, as the EU acts under review were only 
implementing decisions taken by the UN: since the EU did not enjoy any 
discretion concerning the possible course of action, those EU decisions taken 
in implementation of UN decisions could not be reviewed against the funda-
mental principles of EU law.80 However, in Kadi II, the Court of Justice moved 
away from this model of separation between legal orders and concluded that 
UN decisions cannot escape the respect of EU fundamental rights.81 Applying 
this ruling to the standardisation process, it could be argued that the incorpo-
ration of standards elaborated by international organisations or standardisation 
78 An example is the TBT Committee’s Decision ‘Principles for the Development 
of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations’ (G/TBT/9) 13 November 
2000. See De Bellis, above n. 25, 428.
79 Reference here is, for instance, to the application of the limit of the public order 
and rules of necessary application in Italian system of private international law. See 
Article 16 of Italian Law 218/1995.
80 Case T-85/09 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v European Commission ECLI: EU: T: 2010: 
418.
81 Joined cases C-402/05 and 415/05P Kadi & Al Barakaat International Foundation 
v Council & Commission ECLI: EU: C: 2008: 461. For a comment see Grainne de Búrca, 
‘The European Court of Justice, and the International Legal Order’ (2009) Harvard 
International Law Journal 5(1) 1–53; Giacinto Della Cananea, ‘International Security 
and Due Process of Law between the United Nations and the European Union: Yassin 
Abdullah Kadi & Al Baqaraat International Foundation v Council’ (2009) Columbia 
Journal of European Law, Issue 3, 15: 511.
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bodies in EU law implies that their elaboration shall live up to the procedural 
requirements granting the respect of fundamental rights protection in the EU.82
4. CONCLUSIONS
In the light of the inconsistent approach of the Court, it appears that, in spite of 
the increasing success of the use of standards as effective tools for public reg-
ulation in a variety of policy areas, many issues remain to be settled in relation 
to the accountability of private or hybrid regulatory regimes and, essentially, 
to the legitimacy of standard-making processes. 
As shown above, standards penetrate the EU legal system in a variety of 
ways. In particular, standards may be incorporated into EU law through the 
legal mechanism of the reference, or through the reproduction of their text in 
EU acts, in binding or non-binding measures. The legal mechanisms according 
to which the standards enter the legal system influence the position of these 
standards under EU law and, consequently, their judicial review. Arguably, 
this affects not only the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court, but also the legal 
framework according to which the legality of incorporated standards should be 
assessed. However, if indeed, as proposed in the introduction, the purpose of 
judicial review is to support the realisation of the rule of law and, thereby, to 
enhance the legitimacy of standardisation as a regulatory technique, the posi-
tion of the Court towards the judicial review of standards seems to run counter 
to the quest for the legitimacy of the standard-making process. 
If looked through the lenses of criteria such as the hierarchical status of 
a standard and the formal possibility of deviating from it,83 the attitude of the 
Court of Justice appears rather contradictory. On the one hand, the judicial 
review of harmonised European standards, which are formally not binding, 
has evolved in the sense of accepting the jurisdiction of the Court for their 
interpretation under Article 267 TFEU and, in light of recent developments, 
it seems more and more likely that they might be controlled in a direct action 
under Article 263 TFEU. On the other hand, this same possibility for other 
kinds of standards appears to still be precluded, even when incorporated by 
reproduction in EU law and thus constituting binding secondary EU law.
Even more problematic appears to be the lack of guidance with regard to the 
frame of reference according to which a standard would be assessed. In this 
regard, it is argued that the specific legal framework for assessing the legality 
of the standards ought not to be EU administrative law principles, but rather 
the rules and procedures established by the same standardisation bodies in 
82 See Röttger-Wirtz, above n. 13, 244.
83 Möllers, above n. 7, 123.
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their self-regulation capacity. However, such an approach should be mitigated 
by the respect of the democratic principles and the rule of law, assuring the 
respect for the fundamental rights guaranteed in the EU legal system. In this 
sense, further elaboration in case law and the literature is needed in order to 
determine more clearly the minimum guarantees of democracy and respect for 
the rule of law which standard-setting organisations should develop in order 
for their standards to be incorporated in EU law.
Such developments appear very necessary in the light of the uncertain 
legitimacy of standardisation in the EU legal system and, in particular, of 
the inconsistency of the Court on the issues related to the judicial review of 
standards. Much like Catullus’ poem, it seems that the CJEU is currently in 
a love–hate relationship with standardisation. Why does the court do this, 
one could perhaps ask, to paraphrase the Latin poet. To continue with the 
paraphrasing: we do not know, but we feel (and see) it happening and the rule 
of law is tortured.
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